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ARTICLES 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT AND THE 
STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTION 
Kimberly N. Brown * 
Although private parties have perfvrmed government Junctions throughout most 
oj Western history, mainstream administrative law scholarship is dotted with concerns 
over the extent to which modern Jederal government activities are outsourced to private 
contractors. Federal contractors routinely exercise authority that is classically "execu-
tive" in nature. They write regulations, interpret laws, administer Joreign aid, manage 
nuclear weapons sites and intelligence operations, interrogate detainees, control bor-
ders, design surveillance systems, and provide military support in combat zones. 
Administrative law places Jew constraints on private contractors, and prevailing con-
stitutional principles-the state action and private delegation doctrines, in particu-
lar-are either inept at holding private contractors to constitutional norms or utterly 
moribund. A common theme that appears in the vast literature on privatization, there-
Jore, is accountability. There is no recognized constitutional theory that meaningfully 
prohibits Congress or the President from transJerring significant amounts oj discretion-
ary governmental power to wholly private entities that operate beyond the purview oj the 
Constitution, and there is relatively sparse scholarly analysis oj the subject. This Arti-
cle searches Jor a constitutional principle that could be employed to address hypothetical 
outsourcing arrangements that go too Jar Jor the American appetite. In that pursuit, it 
looks to the law governing independent agencies as a natural starting point Jor evalu-
© 2011 Kimberly N. Brown. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may 
reproduce and distribute copies of this article in any format, at or below cost, for 
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to 
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice. 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.A., 
Cornell University; J.D., University of Michigan. Thanks to Professors Amy Dillard, 
Michele Gilman, Dionne Koller, Nancy Modesitt, CJ. Peters, and Charles Tiefer, as 
well as to those who attended my presentation to the University of Baltimore's Junior 
Faculty Forum, for helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this Article. Kristy Nunley, 
Gregg Mosson, and Michael Silvestri provided valuable research assistance. This 
Article was produced with the support of a University of Baltimore Summer Research 
Fellowship. 
49 1 
492 NOTRE DAME LA W REVIEW 
ating the propriety of outsourcing relationships from the standpoint of the structural 
Constitution. It then introduces two ideas with an eye toward sparking fresh thinking 
about the constitutionality of privatization: first, the notion that all actors exercising 
federal government power should be viewed along a constitutional continuum and not 
as occupying separate private/public spheres; and, second, that a democratic accounta-
bility principle may be derived from the Supreme Court s recent decision in Free Enter-
prise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, as a constitutional hook 
for addressing government-by-contract gone awry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"If the founding fathers were to return to observe the organiza-
tionallandscape of the [modern] national government ... they would 
undoubtedly conclude that their constitutional design had been scut-
tled entirely .... [S]ureIya revolution must have occurred."} 
Of course, in the most common sense of the term, no American 
revolution-no overt unwinding of the tripartite political regime cre-
ated by the United States Constitution-has succeeded in the history 
of our constitutional government. 2 No President or Congress has 
been overthrown by a popular movement. No segment of the histori-
cal American populace has fallen subject to an extraconstitutional 
form of national government. The constitutional provisions establish-
ing the core levers of power-Articles I through III-survive in virtu-
ally identical form to those that were ratified in 1789.3 Yet scholars 
1 Barbara Hinkson Craig & Robert S. Gilmour, The Constitution and Accountability 
for Public Functions, 5 GOVERNANCE 46,46 (1992). 
2 See generally JEFF GOODWIN, No OTHER WAY OUT 9 (2001) (offering both broad 
and narrow definitions of "revolution"). 
3 There are some not-insignificant exceptions, including diversity jurisdiction 
(Article III), the process of presidential and vice-presidential elections (12th Amend-
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have expounded on a "drive to shear the federal government of 
power"4 that might qualify as a revolution of sorts. Over the last cen-
tury, the American populace and its national political institutions have 
come to tolerate a steady transfer of important government functions 
from the Congress, the President, and his cabinet,5 to a vast hodge-
podge of quasi-governmental and private actors that evade the over-
sight mechanisms that bind the political branches of government. 
Under a broader definition of revolution, therefore-one that encom-
passes efforts "to transform the political institutions and the justifica-
tions for political authority in a society"6-this massive reshaping of 
government is historic. 
The term "privatization" -or "the range of efforts by govern-
ments to move public functions into private hands and to use market-
style competition"7-covers a broad spectrum of public-private rela-
tionships, from the mundane to the extraordinary. The use of com-
mon procurement and service contracts for routine supplies and 
maintenance is uncontroversial. But government contracting i.s much 
more audacious, encompassing some of the most highly sensitive 
functions within the core responsibilities of government. For exam-
ple, since September 11, 2001, the federal government has hired the 
Rand Corporation to create a national emergency management strat-
egy for the entire federal government;8 entered into billions of dollars 
in no-bid contracts with the Halliburton Corporation to conduct logis-
ment), direct election of senators (l7th Amendment), presidential term limits (22nd 
Amendment), and presidential succession (20th and 25th Amendments). 
4 Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization, and Globalization: Separation of Powers 
Limits on Congressional Authority to Assign Federal Power to Non-Federal Actors, 50 RUTGERS 
L. REv. 331, 332 (1998). 
5 Because it focuses on federal separation-of-powers issues, this Article does not 
address the outsourcing of federal powers to the states, states' use of federal funding 
to hire private contractors, 01' the privatization of state governments-although priva-
tization at the state level is perhaps an even more pressing issue today. For a discus-
sion of these issues, see, for example, Daniel L. Hatcher, Poverty Revenue: The 
Subversion of Fiscal Federalism, 52 ARIZ. L. REv. 675 (2010) (discussing federal grants to 
states to assist anti-poverty efforts). 
6 Jack A. Goldstone, Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory, 4 ANN. 
REv. POL. SCI. 139, 142 (2001). 
7 Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 
116 lIARv. L. REv. 1229, 1230 (2003). Martha Minow's straightforward definition cap-
tures privatization and its late twentieth, early twenty-first century form and rationale. 
8 See Griff Witte & Charles R. Babcock, A Major Test for FEMA and Its Contracting 
Crew, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2005, at AI. After national and local emergency respond-
ers rejected Rand's initial draft as inexperienced, the role of private contractors was 
reduced, and "government officials wrote the final document." Id. 
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tical planning and other support for the U.S. invasion of Iraq;9 
i~ected private military contractors into CIA paramilitary units hunt-
ing AI Qaeda in Afghanistan;IO outsourced flood water drainage and 
the building of 300,000 temporary shelters after Hurricane Katrina;ll 
and approved the wholesale replacement of Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) personnel by private contractors at sixteen U.S. 
airports. 12 The federal government routinely hires private contractors 
to find and supervise other private contractors. I3 At the state level, 14 
criminal prosecutions, prison management, and police authority are 
regularly outsourced in many jurisdictions, 15 while a private firm runs 
the entire city government of Sandy Springs, Georgia. 16 
The annual federal dollars spent on government contracting are 
also rapidly increasing. The Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) reports that federal contracts accounted for more than one-
sixth of all federal spending in 2009, or in excess of $500 billion a 
year, which is "more than double the amount that was spent in 
2001."17 Today, there are 1,931 private companies working in 
national security fields, including counterterrorism, homeland secur-
ity, and intelligence-approximately twenty-five percent of which were 
9 See Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: Privatizing Military AYforts and the Risks to 
Accountability, Professionalism, and DemoCracy, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 110, 115 
Uody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009). 
10 See Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges 
Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REv. 989, 1003 (2005). 
11 See Witte & Babcock, supra note 8. 
12 Derek Kravitz, As Outrage Over Screenings Rises, Sites Consider Replacing TSA, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2010, at AI; see also jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Reframing 
the Outsourcing Debates, in GoVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 9, at 1, 2 ("Recent 
contracts extend to ... military target selection, interrogation of detainees, border 
control, security training, surveillance systems design, intelligence operations man-
agement, control over the collection and use of classified or confidential information, 
and significant military support in a combat zone."). 
13 See Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, National Security Inc., WASH. PosT,july 20, 
2010, at Al (noting that the Department of Homeland Security uses nineteen private 
staffing companies to help it find other private contractors). 
14 But see supra note 6 (noting that government contracting by states is beyond 
the scope of this Article). 
15 See Roger A. Fairfax, j r., Outsourcing Criminal Prosecutions?: The Limits of Criminal 
Justice Privatization, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 266. 
16 See Doug Nurse, New City Bets Millions on Privatization, ATLANTAj.-CONST., Nov. 
12, 2005, at Bl; see also April Hunt, City Takes Fresh Look at Private Services, ATLANTA j.-
CaNST., Mar. 15, 2010, at Bl ("The only city employees are public safety workers and 
top administrators."). 
17 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 106 (2011); see Memo-
randum from jeffrey D. Zients, Fed. Chief Performance Officer, Office of Mgmt. & 
Budget, to the Senior Executive Service (Sept. 14, 2010). 
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created in the past ten years. IS General Dynamics alone collected 
$31.9 billion in 2009 for intelligence contracting with the federal gov-
ernment, which outsources approximately twenty-nine percent of all 
U.S. intelligence jobs at a cost of fIfty percent of its intelligence per-
sonnel budget. 19 
The burgeoning federal contracting business is so impressive that 
it has attracted substantial venture capital.2° In the words of one 
investor: "Every fund is seeing how big the trough is and asking, How 
do I get a piece of that action?"21 In 2005, Fortress America raised 
$46.8 million in an IPO-with "no product, no revenue, and certainly 
no profIts"22-m erely promising to become a holding company for 
homeland security private contractors, with former Congressional 
Representative Tom McMillen at the helm.23 McMillen raised 
another $100 million on the same premise for a fIrm he founded in 
2003.24 Other start-ups are doing the same thing.25 
Taken together, such anecdotes signal a shift in the very structure 
of the "federal government" as we know it. If the outsourcing trend 
were to progress to its logical extreme-if Congress and the President 
were to cede the majority of their respective powers to a parallel "pri-
vate" government designed to operate beyond the purview of electoral 
accountability, constitutional constraints, and judicial review-com-
placency with government outsourcing would likely falter. Under this 
scenario, private lawyers employed by a 'Justice Corporation" would 
operate with different incentives than Department of Justice (DOJ) 
attorneys who take an oath to support and defend the Constitution in 
their enforcement of the federal criminal laws.26 A private Justice 
18 See Priest & Arkin, supra note 13, at A8. 
19 See id. 
20 See Evan Ratliff, Fear, Inc., WIRED, Dec. 2005, at 260. 
21 ld. at 264. 
22 ld. at 260. 
23 ld. 
24 ld. 
25 ld. at 262. 
26 Roger Fairfax develops a "thought experiment" whereby the Department of 
Justice is outsourced to private lawyers based on actual scenarios in smaller jurisdic-
tions. Fairfax, supra note 15, at 276-79; see also id. at 269 (noting that other scholars 
have similarly theorized about the privatization of the criminal justice system (citing 
Laurin A. Wollan,Jr., The Privatization of Criminal Justice, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 29TH 
ANNUAL SOUTHERN CONFERENCE ON CORRECTIONS 111, 124 (1984»). He argues that 
outsourcing "should not extend to criminal prosecution because such outsourcing is 
in tension with the constitutional and positive law norms regulating the public-private 
distinction." ld. at 265. In addition, it raises "concerns about ethics, fairness, trans-
parency, accountability, performance, and the important values advanced by the pub-
lic prosecution norm." ld. 
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Corporation would be self-directing-able to perform more effi-
ciently, unencumbered by presidential oversight and bureaucracy. Yet 
its lawyers might well feel duty-bound to compromise the public's 
interest in criminal law enforcement if it conflicted with the corpora-
tion's primary objective: maximizing profits.27 
Many Americans would likely assume that the Constitution would 
have something to say about whether our federal government could 
be outsourced in toto--that, to some degree at least, the government 
must perform certain core governmental tasks and, if it fails to do so, 
"We the People" could hold our leaders constitutionally accountable. 
But the Supreme Court, in "its role as protector of the constitutional 
design,"28 has failed to develop a doctrinal framework for meaning-
fully scrutinizing transfers of governmental power to private parties. 
There is no accepted constitutional theory that prohibits Congress or 
the President from handing off significant swaths of discretionary gov-
ernmental power to wholly private entities that operate beyond the 
purview of the Constitution. And despite prolific scholarship on the 
topic of privatization,29 there has been relatively little contemporary 
analysis of whether the structural Constitution-the "use of structural 
devices" such as "[c]hecks and balances, separation of powers, and 
federalism" to enable government "by men and over men 'to control 
itself "3°-restrains Congress and the President from handing off pow-
ers to private actors with impunity.31 
This Article begins a dialogue about how one might draw support 
from the structural Constitution for confining the ability of Congress 
and the executive branch to pass government powers on to extracon-
27 See id. at 284-86 (observing that underperformance, lack of transparency, and 
potential conflicts of interest likely arise with prosecution outsourcing). 
28 Craig & Gilmour, supra note 1, at 50. 
29 See generally GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 9 (compiling essays on the 
role of private contractors); Restructuring Local Government, CORNELL UNIVERSITY, 
http:// government.cce.comell.edul doc/viewpage_r.asp?ID=Privatization (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2011) (listing a number of articles and studies about privatization). 
30 Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Exec-
utive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1153, 1155-56 (1992) (quoting THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 51, at 290 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999». Calabresi and 
Rhodes further describe "the structural Constitution" as operating to "preserve indi-
vidual liberty" and "creat[ing] opportunities for' [a] mbition ... to counteract ambi-
tion.'" Id. at 1155 (alterations in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra at 
322). 
31 See PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY 2 (2007) (noting that shift 
from public to private governance and perceived threat to accountability and process 
have been largely unexamined). But cf Kinkopf, supra note 4, at 396 (arguing that 
legislative assignments of federal power to nonfederal actors are not categorically 
barred under general separation of powers principles). 
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stitutional actors. It rejects the sharp public/private divide that 
shapes prevailing law and unveils a new way of looking at outsourcing 
relationships: a constitutional continuum. Having indulged the sup-
position that the Constitution would foreclose the federal government 
from delegating its powers to private actors, closing up shop, and 
going home, it then embarks on a search for constitutional authority 
that undercuts the abdication of constitutional duties and obligations 
by elected officials and their subordinates. 
Finding no clear answer in the constitutional text, the Article 
turns to the law governing independent agencies, which have long 
been the subject of analysis and critique for their structural insulation 
from direct presidential oversight, and identifies overlooked parallels 
between private contractors exercising significant federal authority 
and independent agencies. The Article suggests that the Supreme 
Court's most recent decision regarding the constitutionality of inde-
pendent agencies-Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Over-
sight Boar£i32-implies a democratic accountability principle that could 
be extended to the privatization context.33 
Part I describes the general trend toward increased delegation of 
federal powers to private entities and the swelling consensus that 
accountability is a central problem with outsourcing. It then 
addresses the prevailing constitutional approaches to government out-
sourcing-the state action and private delegation doctrines, in partic-
ular-as well as pertinent common law and statutory law, and suggests 
that current law is ad hoc and ineffective at ensuring proper execu-
tion of government power by private actors, particularly where sensi-
tive public functions are concerned. What is missing is a systematic 
approach to outsourcing that takes into account the relationship 
between private contractors exercising government powers and the 
tripartite constitutional structure of government, which is designed to 
promote accountability. 
Part II rejects the sharp distinction that prevailing doctrine draws 
between the public and private realms and proposes a new way of 
looking at government outsourcing: viewing private contractors along 
a constitutional continuum that begins with the President and his cab-
inet and includes independent agencies. If private contractors are 
perceived as bearing some anatomic relationship to established gov-
32 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
33 The Article leaves for further research and reflection a number of important 
related issues, such as how best to further support and define the contours of an 
accountability principle, how courts would apply it in practice, and whether it would 
operate effectively to address problematic outsourcing arrangements. 
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ernment entities exercising similar powers, the structural Constitution 
becomes relevant to the task of evaluating the propriety of outsourc-
ing arrangements. Part II then analyzes privatization from the stand-
point of the structural Constitution in an effort to identify textual 
arguments for drawing outer constitutional boundaries on outsourc-
ing in the extreme. Although answers to the outsourcing conundrum 
do not lie in the constitutional text alone, the Court has drawn power-
ful inferences from Article II that may prove helpful in shaping a new 
constitutional doctrine for privatization. 
Part III posits that the law governing independent agencies offers 
a promising template for analyzing the structural propriety of govern-
ment outsourcing, introduces a functionalist accountability principle 
drawn in part from the majority opinion in Free Enterprise Fund, and 
suggests that such an accountability principle could be extended to 
the privatization context where the structural Constitution has largely 
escaped the debate to date. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DISCONNECT 
This Part begins with a description of the flourishing privatization 
trend and a central concern that surrounds it: insufficient oversight 
and accountability. It then reviews the recognized constitutional doc-
trines that bear upon privatization, and suggests that their inability to 
address perceived abuses stems from a myopic view of the relationship 
between private contractors and the structural Constitution. 
A. Private Contractors: The Problem 
Much has been written about the increasingly pervasive phenom-
enon of privatization, or what leading scholars have called "govern-
ment by contract."34 Although privatization takes many forms, this 
Article concerns itself with the particularly common phenomenon 
known as outsourcing-where "the government contracts with a pri-
vate entity to render goods or services previously provided by the gov-
ernment."35 Under such arrangements, the government retains the 
ultimate responsibility for the matters that are outsourced;36 it pro-
vides the funding, establishes programmatic goals, and sets parame-
ters and requirements.37 Instead of a government officer or employee 
implementing those goals, however, a private party does so by con-
34 Freeman & Minow, supra note 12, at l. 
35 Fairfax, supra note 15, at 266. 
36 See id. at 268. 
37 See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1367, 
1394-95 (2003). 
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tract.38 A private contractor and its government counterpart might 
perform identical tasks. What distinguishes them is their respective 
employers-the government actor is an employee of the government 
and bound by the constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and personnel 
limitations that apply to government employees, while the private 
actor is employed by a private company; his primary obligations to the 
government-and thus to the populace it serves-are defined by 
contract. 
The mere notion that private parties are paid to perform work 
that the government would otherwise do is not controversial; private 
actors have performed governmental functions throughout Western 
history.39 For most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, how-
ever, federal and state governments' engagement of private actors was 
largely indirect-through subsidies designed to encourage private ini-
tiatives for the public's benefit, such as efforts to protect the environ-
ment or improve public safety.40 In contrast, as Martha Minow 
explains, "the government now uses contracts with private providers 
to accomplish tasks specified by the government."41 
Thus, what many find troubling about the current outsourcing 
trend is the "scope and scale" of the use of private contractors in mod-
ern government.42 In fiscal year 2009, agencies paid over $54l.3 bil-
lion-twenty-three percent of federal discretionary spending dollars-
to private contractors. 43 Of that sum, $38 billion went to Lockheed 
Martin alone,44 which has contracted with the government for goods 
and services ranging from military sales to the running of welfare 
offices.45 
38 See Fairfax, supra note 15, at 268. 
39 See Edward Rubin, The Possibilities and Limitations oj Privatization, 123 HARv. L. 
REv. 890, 894-95 (2010) (book review). 
40 See Freeman & Minow, supra note 12, at 6-7. 
41 Id. at 7. 
42 See id. at 1; see also VERKUIL, supra note 31, at 3 (,"Outsourcing sovereignty' 
occurs when the idea of privatization is carried too far."). 
43 See Prime Award Spending Data, USAsPENDING.GOV, http://www.usaspending. 
gov / exp lore? &carryfilters=on&fromfiscal=yes&tab= By% 20 Prime % 20Awardee&fiscal_ 
year=2009&tab=By+Prime+Awardee&fromfiscal=yes&trendreport=top_cont (last vis-
ited on Oct. 23, 2011). 
44 See id. 
45 See Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era oj Privatized Welfare, 89 
CALIF. L. REv. 569, 571 (2001) (discussing Lockheed Martin's role in the provision of 
welfare services). 
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Of course, outsourcing has its benefits,46 and many federal con-
tracts-such as procurement contracts for laundry services or office 
supplies for Veterans Administration hospitals-are routine and well-
accepted.47 It is when private contractors are hired to perform sensi-
tive government functions-"activities that fall closer to the 'core' of 
what the public in the twentieth century came to identify as the state's 
responsibility in a democratic society"48-that deeper concerns arise. 
Contractors now carry out activities that were once considered the 
exclusive responsibility of government,49 such as "writing regulations 
and budgets for government agencies, producing statutorily required 
reports, interpreting laws, delivering social services, administering for-
eign aid, and managing nuclear weapons sites," among other tasks50-
many of which entail the discretionary spending of federal taxpayer 
money. Private contractors support military operations in Iran and 
Mghanistan, provide security for American diplomats, "certify[ ] that 
hazardous waste cleanups conform to statutory requirements,"5! and 
perform TSA's recently-enhanced search techniques at sixteen U.S. 
airports.52 It is when private contractors perform especially sensitive 
46 It is important to note the many perceived benefits of federal contracting, 
although the topic is too deep to explore in this Article. A key justification for the 
increased reliance on federal government contracting is cost containment and effi-
ciency. Because of market competition, private sector entrepreneurs are considered 
less likely to spend for the sake of spending, more apt to seek low-cost alternatives, 
and better able to adapt quickly to rapidly changing circumstances. See KEVIN R. 
KOSAR, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., PRIVATIZATION AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 6 
(2006). Critics view the federal government, by comparison, as monopolistic, overly 
bureaucratic, slow to innovate, and inefficient. See id. at 4; Freeman & Minow, supra 
note 12, at 7. Social scientists have noted, however, that there is little empirical 
research or data about the relative cost-effectiveness and overall effects of privatiza-
tion. See Ralph M. Kramer, Voluntary Agencies and the Contract Culture: "Dream or 
Nightmare?", 68 Soc. SERVo REv. 33, 36 (1994) (discussing contracting of social ser-
vices). Fiscal and administrative expediency-rather than a rational cost-benefit anal-
ysis by agency officials-most often accounts for the decision to outsource the delivery 
of government services. See id. at 40-41. 
47 See Freeman & Minow, supra note 12, at 11. 
48 Id. at 6. 
49 See id. at 1. 
50 Id. at 2; see also VERKUIL, supra note 31, at 23-42, 109 (listing examples of gov-
ernment work that is outsourced, including military events, public service obligations 
for civilian disasters, state prison management, decision and speech writing, docu-
ment summary and review, draft decision-making, and oversight of government 
contractors) . 
51 Freeman & Minow, supra note 12, at 6. 
52 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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government functions that the need for a constitutional approach to 
outsourcing is most pressing. 53 
To be sure, government contracting is governed by myriad rules 
and procedures. The President controls the outsourcing process 
through the Office of Management and Budget, which in 1976 put in 
place Circular A-76 to govern the competitive sourcing of federal 
jobs.54 Circular A-76 forbids the outsourcing of "inherently govern-
mental" functions, which it defines to include activities that deter-
mine, protect, or advance U.S. interests by military action or contract 
management; that significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of 
private persons; or that exert ultimate control over the disposition of 
federal property. 55 As Paul Verkuil has observed, "[t]he use of private 
military contractors such as Blackwater clearly fails this test,"56 and it is 
not difficult to see that other contracts are falling through the cracks, 
as well.57 
Although the established procedures work for some contracts, 
they fail for others. In practice, some agencies ignore the A-76 guide-
lines,58 which are not legally binding. As a consequence, billions of 
dollars in government contracts have been made "literally off the 
books," "awarded under suspicious circumstances, hurriedly and with-
out competition," and executed under terms that "are so underspeci-
fied as to afford contractors almost unlimited discretion."59 
Information about the contracting process and associated costs is diffi-
cult to obtain,60 leaving the public largely in the dark-unable to 
53 The question arises as to how to determine when government functions are 
sufficiently sensitive to warrant constitutional scrutiny. Further research might con-
sider, for example, whether private contractor activities that influence civil liberties or 
interfere with the President's Article II powers fall into this category. 
54 See Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern, in GOVERNMENT BY CON-
TRACT, supra note 9, at 310, 326 (citing Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the 
President, Circular No. A-76, Attachment A (Revised) (1999) [hereinafter OMB Cir-
cular A-76]). OMB's role in the process has led to tensions with Congress over the 
effectiveness of private sourcing, the propriety of classifications by agencies, and the 
lack of sufficient federal personnel to administer the standards. See VERKUIL, supra 
note 31, at 126. 
55 See Verkuil, supra note 54, at 326 (citing OMB Circular No. A-76, supra note 
54). An agency's decision of what is "inherently governmental" is effectively not 
reviewable. VERKUIL, supra note 31, at 128. Although an "interested party" can lodge 
a legal challenge, Article III standing problems can preclude judicial review. See id.; 
Verkuil, supra note 54, at 326. 
56 Verkuil, supra note 54, at 326. 
57 See, e.g., supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text. 
58 See Freeman & Minow, supra note 12, at 3. 
59 Id. 
60 See id. 
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meaningfully influence the privatization trend, despite the high stakes 
involved in the private execution of inherently governmental 
functions. 
While the contracting process is flawed, the available legal and 
political methods for holding private contractors accountable for 
their actions are lacking as well. At bottom, the government-contrac-
tor relationship is defined by contractual terms, rather than broader 
norms of democratic governance that shape public expectations of 
federal actors. The parties may contract out of common law protec-
tions that the public might consider desirable.61 An agency can bring 
a claim for a breach of contract under the Contract Disputes Act,62 
but successful litigation requires clear and enforceable contract terms 
and sufficient agency resources and motivation to monitor perform-
ance and pursue claims.63 Although the United States Agency for 
International Development was responsible for approximately $3 bil-
lion in reconstruction projects for Iraq, for example, it had only four 
contract monitoring personnel as of March 2003 and later outsourced 
the monitoring function itself.64 Agencies can exclude underper-
forming contractors from future procurement activities,65 but such 
discretionary oversight is makeshift and inadequate. 
There are other avenues to litigation, but they have a limited 
impact, as well. Private tort law offers the public a means of holding 
contractors accountable through the courts, but powerful immunity 
laws often prohibit effective relief. 66 The False Claims Act67 allows pri-
vate persons to bring qui tam suits on the government's behalf to 
recover penalties for presenting false or fraudulent claims, but the 
statutory scienter requirement is difficult to satisfY.68 
61 SeeJody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 
591 (2000). 
62 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109 (2006). 
63 Nina A. Mendelson, Six Simple Steps to Increase Contractor Accountability, in Gov-
ERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 9, at 241,245-46 (citing 41 U.S.C. § 601 (2006)). 
64 See Laura A. Dickinson, Public Values/Private Contract, in GOVERNMENT BY CON-
TRACT, supra note 9, at 335, 343. 
65 See Mendelson, supra note 63, at 245. 
66 See, e.g., Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 557 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying immu-
nity to private foster care contractor in action under federal disability laws); Pani v. 
Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying immunity 
to private insurance company in Medicare dispute); see also Richard]. Pierce,Jr., Out-
sourcing is Not Our Only Problem, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1216, 1227-29 (2008) (book 
review) (arguing that private contractors should not be immunized for government 
work performed). 
67 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006). 
68 See Dickinson, supra note 64, at 356. 
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To be sure, private contractors are susceptible to hearings by con-
gressional committees, which can request Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) reports of their activities.69 As Gillian Metzger has sug-
gested, however, regulatory or contractual measures are essentially a 
matter of "legislative or executive grace"70 and rarely capture legisla-
tors' attention, with a few high profile exceptions like Halliburton.71 
Administrative law, moreover, places no legal constraints on pri-
vate contractors.72 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)73-the 
primary statutory source for public disclosure, public involvement in 
rulemaking, and judicial review of government decision-making-
applies only to agencies,74 creating an impenetrable legal division 
between governmental and nongovernmental activity.75 As a conse-
quence, the APA's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)76 provisions 
do not require private contractors to make available to the public any 
records related to their work for the federal government.77 Thus, in 
the aftermath of the Space Shuttle Columbia's tragic disintegration 
over Texas in 2003, a contractor who was deeply involved in the pro-
gram had no obligation to produce pertinent documents for investiga-
tion under the FOIA.78 
There is, in short, no overriding legal or political force that is 
driving implementation of the various oversight mechanisms toward a 
single goal: ensuring accountability for private contractors engaged in 
inherently governmental functions. And as described below, because 
the prevailing constitutional doctrine is unconcerned with the rela-
tionship between private actors exercising federal power and the struc-
tural Constitution, it cannot play the role of policing their adherence 
69 See Mendelson, supra note 63, at 245. 
70 Metzger, supra note 37, at 1404-05. 
71 See Mendelson, supra note 63, at 245. 
72 See David H. Rosenbloom & Suzanne Piotrowski, Outsourcing the Constitution 
and Administrative Law Norms, 35 AM. REv. OF PUB. ADMIN. 103, 104-05 (2005). 
73 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2006). 
74 See id. § 551; see also Metzger, supra note 37, at 1434 (noting that, whereas the 
APA applies only to "agencies," regulations governing contractors focus on preventing 
fraud versus providing a way to challenge contractors' actions). 
75 See Rosenbloom & Piotrowski, supra note 72, at 104-05. 
76 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
77 See id.; see also VERKUIL, supra note 31, at 90 (noting that the FOIA is a "force 
for public legitimacy" that does not apply to documents held by private contractors). 
78 See Mendelson, supra note 63, at 250. 
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to the wider democratic values that inform the roles of purely public 
actors. 79 
B. The Shortcomings of Current Constitutional Doctrine 
The primary means available for keeping federal contractors' 
actions within constitutional constraints is the state action doctrine.8o 
The state action doctrine asks whether private parties should be 
treated as government actors susceptible to liability for violations of 
individual constitutional rights.81 It springs from the premise that 
only the government is bound by the Constitution. In the words of 
the Supreme Court, the Fourteenth Amendment "affords no shield" 
against private conduct, "no matter how unfair that conduct may 
be."82 The state action doctrine thus emerged as a means of distin-
guishing between public and private acts for purposes of determining 
whether the constraints imposed by the Bill of Rights apply to ostensi-
bly private behavior. But the state action doctrine is inept at meaning-
fully addressing outsourcing abuses for a number of reasons. 
To begin with, it does not enable constitutional challenges to the 
delegation of government power to private parties or the exercise of 
that power beyond constitutional limits. It only allows individual 
plaintiffs to obtain injunctive relief against a private entity or compen-
sation after-the-fact for violations of their personal constitutional 
rights, leaving agencies constitutionally unmoored in their decision to 
hand off government functions in the first place. 
Second, as a means of securing relief for individuals, the state 
action doctrine has been widely criticized as wrong-headed and inef-
fective.83 Because it is an all-or-nothing proposition-either the full 
panoply of constitutional strictures applies to a private party exercis-
ing government functions, or none at a1l84-it is prone to underinclu-
79 See Gillian E. Metzger, Private Delegations, Due Process, and the Duty to Supervise, in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRAGr, supra note 9, at 291,294 ("[C]urrent constitutional law 
has little relevance to privatization."). 
80 See Metzger, supra note 37, at 1410. 
81 See Metzger, supra note 79, at 292. 
82 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988); see also 
Sheila S. Kennedy, "When is Private Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization and 
Public-Private Partnerships, 11 GEO. MAsON U. C.R. LJ. 203, 209 (2001) (discussing the 
Fourteenili Amendment, which extended the Bill of Rights to the States). 
83 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 82, at 217 (noting "[t]he lack of clarity and con-
sistency in the application of the state action doctrine, and judicial reluctance to find 
state action where ordinary people would see it"); Metzger, supra note 37, at 1410-11 
(arguing that "current doctrine is fundamentally ill-suited to [the] task" of "ensuring 
constitutional accountability in a world of privatized government"). 
84 See Metzger, supra note 37, at 1431. 
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siveness or, more rarely, overinclusiveness.85 According to a survey by 
Gillian Metzger, lower court decisions "overwhelmingly ... reject state 
action claims" in cases involving various privatization arrangements, 
citing concerns of "individual autonomy, federalism, and the regula-
tory prerogatives of elected government."86 She adds that "few of the 
Court's state action decisions even identify-let alone emphasize-the 
importance of ensuring that exercises of government power do not 
escape constitutional constraints as an underlying imperative of state 
action doctrine."87 The state action doctrine historically included a 
public function test, but it was abandoned in part because of ambigui-
ties in the definition of an inherently-governmental responsibility.88 
As a consequence, private contractors routinely exercise government 
power unrestrained by the myriad constitutional checks that exist to 
address abuses by government actors. 
Third, the state action doctrine targets the least problematical 
public-private arrangements for constitutional scrutiny. To identify 
state action, there must be evidence of government compulsion, con-
trol, or participation in the specific action at issue.89 Because the state 
action doctrine turns on a finding of government coercion or involve-
ment in a private act, its practical effect is counterintuitive. The more 
discretion a private party is afforded to act independently of the gov-
ernment, the less likely the Constitution will apply to limit the arbi-
85 See id. at 1421-22. Professor Metzger observes that the doctrine is simultane-
ously overinclusive "because it makes private actors directly subject to constitutional 
constraints even when an instance of privatization does not raise the specter of unac-
countable government power." Id. at 1421. 
86 Id. at 1419-21 & n.185. 
87 Id. at 142l. 
88 See Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and 
Their Constitutionality, 16 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 203-05 (1989) ("The Supreme 
Court has so narrowed the public function component of the state action doctrine as 
to render it almost meaningless."); cf Metzger, supra note 37, at 1449-51 (discussing 
problems with expanding the public function test). 
89 See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); Metzger, supra note 37, at 
1416-17. Gillian Metzger summarizes the state action doctrine as having two prongs: 
[F]irst, whether "the [challenged] deprivation ... [was] caused by the exer-
cise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct 
imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible"; and 
second, whether "the party charged with the deprivation ... [is) a person 
who may fairly be said to be a state actor." 
Id. at 1412 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982». Profes-
sor Metzger notes that, because the first prong is easily satisfied, the key step is the 
second, which is "often alternatively characterized as determining whether 'there is a 
sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action.'" Id. at 1412 & 
n.149 (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999». 
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trary exercise of that discretion.90 The state action doctrine thus 
enables government to avoid constitutional responsibility for initia-
tives that it outsources.91 As numerous scholars have emphasized, 
close government oversight of private contractors is necessary to 
ensure accountability;92 it is when contractors have more discretion to 
exercise governmental power that the need for supervision is most 
essential. 
The state action doctrine is not the only constitutional theory 
available for testing the propriety of outsourcing relationships. The 
nondelegation or the private delegation doctrine asks whether the 
assignment of governmental authority to a non-governmental actor is 
itself precluded by the Constitution.93 In the New Deal era, the Court 
famously thwarted congressional attempts to delegate the Article I leg-
islative power to the executive branch94 and, later, to private hands.95 
But the doctrine has lapsed into desuetude.96 The Court later upheld 
legislation enabling private individuals to engage in regulatory efforts 
on the grounds that public officials ultimately retained review author-
ity.97 The theoretical prohibition on private delegations, therefore, "is 
90 See Metzger, supra note 37, at 1425. 
91 ld. at 1432. 
92 See DONALD F. KElTL, SHARING POWER 39, 179-211 (1993); ELLIOlT D. SCLAR, 
You DON'T ALWAYS GET WHAT You PAY FOR 121-29 (2001); Freeman, supra note 61, at 
605-08, 623-25, 634-36 (2000); Metzger, supra note 37, at 1436-37 (citing Michael C. 
Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Axperimentalist Government, 
53 VAND. L. REv. 831, 865-68 (2000)). 
93 See Metzger, supra note 37, at 141l. 
94 See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
95 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down a statute 
authorizing local coal boards to determine coal prices and employee wages and 
hours). The Court based its decision on the Commerce and Due Process Clauses. See 
id. at 297-304. 
96 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative 
State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008,76 U. CHI. L. REv. 1613, 1630-31 (2009) 
("[T]he nondelegation doctrine is largely moribund at the level of constitutional 
law."); cf. Daryl]. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARv. L. REv. 2312, 2358-59 (2006) ("Although the Court has invalidated only two 
acts of Congress on nondelegation grounds, ... the principle lives on in the form of a 
number of 'nondelegation canons' of statutory construction and is invoked from time 
to time by Justices calling for its revival. The principle also lives on in the scholarly 
literature." (footnotes omitted)). 
97 See Metzger, supra note 37, at 1438-43. A related problem left unaddressed by 
the private delegation doctrine has to do with the nature of government oversight; if 
significant governmental authority is delegated to a contractor but a government offi-
cial oversees her work, does the government official's "sign-off' remedy problems with 
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all but dead in practice,"98 leaving only the flawed state action doc-
trine in its place. 
II. BRIDGING THE DIVIDE 
This Part suggests that a key shortcoming with current constitu-
tional doctrine is the clean publici private divide that animates the 
state action doctrine and statutes like the APA. Accordingly, it shifts 
away from this dichotomous approach and introduces a substitute 
concept: a constitutional continuum on which all actors exercising 
federal power lie. This Part then looks to the text of the Constitution 
to identify available grounds for drawing a perimeter around the 
scope of government contracting. While the text alone does not 
resolve the issue, limitations on outsourcing to private figures find 
support in the Court's Article II analysis of independent agencies, as 
Part III goes on to explain. 
A. An Overlooked Constitutional Continuum 
As shown above, no recognized constitutional standards exist to 
address the most extreme outsourcing scenario-that is, the creation 
of a shadow government controlled by corporate America. As a result, 
no one is at the helm of the rapidly expanding government con-
tracting industry, steering it along a path that adheres to constitu-
tional and democratic norms. The problem stems in part from the 
state action doctrine's unrealistic dichotomy between the public and 
the private spheres. Contractors exercising governmental functions 
should instead be viewed as anatomically related to government actors 
within a structure that leads all the way to the President. If a constitu-
tional continuum is accepted as a substitute concept for the publici 
private divide, new frontiers in the privatization debate might open. 
the delegation itself? Must the oversight be more than a "rubber stamp"? See generally 
VERKUIL, supra note 31, at 109-10 (exploring these questions). 
98 Metzger, supra note 37, at 1440-41 & n.249 (citing cases upholding delega-
tions). Throughout the many decades that have passed since the trilogy of successful 
New Deal challenges, scholars have repeatedly urged the nondelegation doctrine's 
resurrection, with proposals ranging from a '''new delegation doctrine' focusing not 
on 'who ought to make law' but rather on 'how (or how well) the law is being made,'" 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 319, 343 (2002) (quoting Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the 
Administrative State, 109 YALE LJ. 1399, 1402 (2000)), to a "rethink[ing] [of] state 
action in private delegation terms," Metzger, supra note 37, at 1456. 
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Although delegations to private entities have occurred "largely 
without any consideration of their constitutional justification,"99 the 
Constitution still offers a means of ensuring that private contractors 
are accountable to the public. Yet under the prevailing state action 
doctrine, the vantage point from which one assesses the legality of 
public-private arrangements dictates whether structural constitutional 
norms come into play. A case for state action doctrine begins with the 
assumption that the contractor is a purely private actor. When gov-
ernmental duties are added to the private actor's job description, the 
state action doctrine asks whether the actor has effectively morphed 
from private to public status by virtue of governmental control and 
oversight. Thus, at the outset of the state action analysis, the private 
actor is completely off the constitutional radar, and the doctrine asks 
whether she in fact belongs within it because of her susceptibility to 
government control. Eventually, government control over the private 
actor is so strong that she transforms into a state actor encumbered-
and protected-by constitutional guarantees. 
By contrast, the well-developed law governing a close relative of 
the private contractor-the independent agencylOO-begins its 
inquiry firmly within the boundaries of the Constitution. Whether 
Congress can create a novel quasi-government entity, endow it with 
executive powers, and keep it insulated from direct presidential over-
sight is a question that has long been answered first and foremost by 
reference to Article II.lOI Officers of independent agencies are pre-
sumptively treated as state actors. 102 As a result, in cases addressing 
the constitutionality of independent agencies, the inquiry turns 
promptly to questions of proper constitutional design. 103 
There is no constitutional "comfort zone" in which Congress 
could theoretically create an entity that is so "privatized" that it 
99 Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of 
Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 62, 69 (1990). 
100 Independent agencies are distinguishable from cabinet-level agencies in sev-
eral ways: they are generally comprised of multi-member boards from competing 
political parties; they serve fixed, staggered terms; and the President can only remove 
them for cause. See Kimberly N. Brown, Presidential Control of the Elite "Non-Agency, "88 
N.C. L. REv. 71,79 (2009). 
101 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 109-10 (1926) (indicating that the 
President's power to remove officers is incident to his Article II appointment power). 
102 In Free Enterprise Fund, the parties agreed that the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) was a state actor. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3148 (2010) (citing Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. 
Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 397 (1995». 
103 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-90 (1988) (assessing the consti-
tutionality of the independent counsel statute under Article II). 
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escapes constitutional scrutiny altogether under a state action theory. 
Presumably, the Supreme Court would be hard-pressed to sanction 
legislation that scrapped the DOJ entirely in favor of a giant private 
law firm tasked with enforcing the federal criminal laws, for example. 
Such a scenario is so unthinkable that it is almost Silly104-it would 
surely be held unconstitutional under the independent agency line of 
cases because the President and his appointment and removal powers 
would be cut out of the equation altogether.105 The Court might also 
balk at the practical effect of a private Justice Corporation under the 
state action doctrine-the Constitution would not apply to hinder pri-
vate prosecutors' misconduct if the government in fact ceded control, 
thereby enabling violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses, for example, with impunity. In sum, while a private contrac-
tor can lose its private status for purposes of the Constitution as the 
level of government influence increases, the inverse is not true; an 
entity created as part of the public legislative process cannot lose its 
public status for purposes of the Constitution as Congress decreases 
the level of government influence over it. 
To illustrate, suppose private parties form the Justice Corporation 
and gradually contract with the government to perform more and 
more functions formerly performed by the DO]. The presumption in 
such a case would be that the Justice Corp. is a private actor, not a 
state actor; only if its activities are closely enough supervised by the 
government would it become a state actor. Now suppose, in contrast, 
that Congress creates, by statute, an independent agency called the 
Justice Corporation, insulates it entirely from executive branch con-
trol, and confers upon it exactly the same functions formerly per-
formed by the DO]. Not only would the presumption here be that the 
Justice Corp. is a state-not a private actor-but its operation would 
be held a violation of Article II under current doctrine. In both cases, 
we have a virtually identical Justice Corp. performing identical func-
tions with identical freedom from government oversight, and yet their 
respective constitutional status is diametrically opposite. 
This logical disconnect between the state action and independent 
agency analyses ignores a modern reality: the public and private sec-
tors intersect in myriad and complex ways. While courts remain wed-
ded to the notion that the public and the private are distinct,106 new 
104 But see supra note 26 (discussing scholarship regarding private prosecutors at 
the state level). 
105 Cf Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM 
URB. LJ. 1507, 1510-11 (2001) (making a similar point about the postal service). 
106 Numerous commentators have challenged as unrealistic the notion that the 
public and the private are separate spheres. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 61, at 598 
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forms of hybrid public/private entities continue to proliferate. In 
addition to covering numerous flavors of independent agency such as 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), the federal government umbrella includes wholly-
owned government corporations such as the United States Postal Ser-
vice, corporations partly-owned by the federal government, federally 
chartered corporations that are privately owned,107 government spon-
sored enterprises (GSEs) like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,108 self-
regulatory organizations (SROs) such as the New York Stock 
Exchange, as well as numerous offices, boards, commissions, and 
foundations with all different sorts of government ties. 109 This 
impressive collection of quasi-government entities is likewise charac-
terized by varying degrees of executive branch control and accounta-
bility; while GSEs are not subject to the FOIA, for example, certain-
but not all-federal corporations are treated as agencies within the 
meaning of the APA.110 
If the various arrangements by which the many public, private, 
and quasi-public actors exercising governmental power were plotted 
on a constitutional graph or continuum rather than within separate 
public and private spaces, it would be immediately evident that no 
crisp line exists between the public and the private spheres. To be 
sure, cabinet-level agencies would reside on one end of this contin-
uum and purely private actors with no government affiliations on the 
other. But between those poles would lie a vast array of "quasi-" enti-
ties.n l A rough illustration of the continuum followsll2: 
(critiquing the public/private distinction and related hierarchical accountability 
structures and proposing aggregate accountability through horizontal negotiation). 
Critical legal studies developed the realist idea that the private realm is already highly 
structured and regulated by the state, eroding the public/private divide. See id. at 565 
& n.S4. 
107 See Beermann, supra note 105, at 1517. See generally Marshall J. Breger & Gary 
J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 
52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1111, 122S-31 (2000) ("While they share similar characteristics 
with the independent agencies ... [public corporations'] corporate structure is the 
feature that sets them apart from the independent agency."). 
lOS A government sponsored enterprise "is a federally chartered, privately owned, 
privately managed financial institution that has only specialized lending and guaran-
tee powers and that bond-market investors perceive as implicitly backed by the federal 
government." Richard Scott Carnell, Handling the Failure of a Government-Sponsored 
Enterprise, SO WASH. L. REv. 565,570 (2005). 
109 Breger & Edles, supra note 107, at 1199. See generally id. at 122S-34 (discussing 
government corporations and GSEs generally). 
110 See id. at 1229-30. 
III In his dissenting opinion in Free Enterprise Fund, Justice Breyer emphasized that 
federal statutes broadly delegate a host of powers and responsibilities to "a host of 
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officers GSEs/SROs non-sensitive 
To treat private contractors engaged in federal regulatory, plan-
ning, military, or national intelligence work as if they bear no struc-
tural relationship to actors performing identical tasks somewhere else 
along the continuum is to engage in a fiction. And the fiction is a 
potentially dangerous one, because it sets privatization adrift with no 
constitutional mooring. Private contractors are left to perform 
increasingly sensitive government functions while federal judges and 
elected officials turn a blind eye to the broader implications because 
no recognized constitutional principle demands otherwise. If private 
contractors are properly viewed as falling somewhere on a single con-
tinuum alongside all quasi-government actors, consideration of the 
limits on the extent to which private actors can function as an extra-
constitutional proxy for the federal government becomes inevita-
different organizational structures." Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Over-
sight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3168 (2010) (Breyer,]., dissenting). He explained: 
Sometimes they delegate administrative authority to the President directly; 
sometimes they place authority in a long-established Cabinet department; 
sometimes they delegate authority to an independent commission or board; 
sometimes they place authority directly in the hands of a single senior 
administrator; sometimes they place it in a sub-cabinet bureau, office, divi-
sion or other agency; sometimes they vest it in multimember or multiagency 
task groups; sometimes they vest it in commissions or advisory committees 
made up of members of more than one branch; sometimes they divide it 
among groups of departments, commissions, bureaus, divisions, and admin-
istrators; and sometimes they permit state or local governments to partici-
pate as well. 
Id. (citations omitted). In making the point that "it is not surprising that administra-
tive units comes in many different shapes and sizes," Justice Breyer did not mention 
that such administrative units increasingly include private companies. See id. at 3169. 
112 Of course, the point here is to illustrate the continuum concept, not commit to 
a particular order of relationships. 
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ble.113 This repositioning of the relationship between the public and 
private spheres is advantageous insofar as it reveals the structural Con-
stitution as an inherent component of all outsourcing relationships-
one that has been largely lost in the privatization debate. 
B. Outsourcing and the Constitutional Text 
The previous section asserts that, as a practical matter, a constitu-
tional continuum is a more accurate depiction of the relationship 
between government and private actors exercising government pow-
ers than a public/private dichotomy. The question that next arises is 
whether the text of the Constitution has anything to say about limiting 
privatization. Although, as this subpart shows, the constitutional text 
alone does not resolve the issue of outsourcing one way or another, 
the Court has drawn powerful inferences from the language of Article 
II to justifY and shape independent agencies; as Part III explains, such 
inferences have important implications for the constitutionality of 
outsourcing. 
If the Supreme Court were to analyze the outsourcing of federal 
power to private parties alongside independent agency delegations, it 
might begin at the same place: "at the intersection of two general con-
stitutional principles."114 On the one hand, Articles I, II, and III of 
the Constitution "separately and respectively vest 'all legislative Pow-
ers' in Congress, the 'executive Power' in the President, and the Judi-
cial Power' in the Supreme Court (and such 'inferior Courts as 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish')."1l5 One 
might therefore infer that the text lodges all federal power some-
where in the coordinate branches of government-and nowhere in 
the private sector. Nothing in the Constitution's text expressly autho-
rizes Congress or the President to delegate their respective powers 
elsewhere. 
On the other hand, the Constitution gives Congress expansive 
power to enact legislation "necessary and proper for carrying into Exe-
cution ... all ... Powers" vested in the government. I 16 Although one 
might construe the word "necessary" narrowly or refuse to defer to 
Congress regarding the necessity of a particular measure, a liberal 
reading of the clause would authorize the outsourcing of federal pow-
113 Arguably, one difference between private contractor~ and independent agen-
cies lies in the degree to which the latter prompts concern over the division of power 
amongst the branches. 
114 Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3165 (Breyer,]., dissenting). 
115 Id. 
116 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 18. 
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ers through legislation if Congress considers it necessary and 
proper. 117 
The Constitution contains no language that would expressly limit 
such manifestations of legislative power other than the Tenth Amend-
ment's mandate that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the People."1l8 While the question 
whether the Tenth Amendment creates an enforceable constraint on 
Congress is a matter of debate,119 the text's emphasis on the protec-
tion of state sovereignty and federalism deflects from-rather than 
elucidates-the federal outsourcing question. 
One might look next to the countervailing sources of federal 
power-Articles II20 and II-to see whether they contain language 
curtailing Congress's power to outsource federal authority on neces-
sary and proper grounds. The term "executive power" in Article II's 
Vesting Clause arguably implies broad presidential power to supervise 
and control the exercise of executive power by nongovernmental 
actors. The provision which directs the president to "take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed"121 similarly suggests that congres-
sional authority to assign federal power to private parties is not unlim-
ited: Congress must leave the President with sufficient authority to 
manage a private party's exercise of executive authority if he is to ful-
117 Cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 WheaL) 316,415 (1819) (construing the 
Necessary and Proper Clause broadly to permit Congress to legislate freely if neces-
sary and proper to carry out a power enumerated in the Constitution). 
118 U.S. CaNsT. amend. X. See generally Beermann, supra note 105, at 1515-16 
(reading Tenth Amendment jurisprudence as offering a potential accountability-
based doctrine for evaluating privatization). 
119 See ERWlN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 312-13 (3d ed. 2006). 
120 The Constitution vests the 'Judicial Power" in the Supreme Court, but leaves it 
to Congress whether to create inferior courts with tenure and salary protections. See 
U.S. CaNST. art III, § 1. Article III goes on to define the judicial power to include, 
most prominently, "cases or controversies" under federal law or arising under diver-
sity jurisdiction. See id. art III, § 2. The Supreme Court, of course, has long found 
administrative courts constitutional, despite their exercise of Article III judicial power 
and lack of salary and tenure protections. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (upholding legislative grant of jurisdiction 
over state law counterclaim to non-Article III court, where counterclaim was relevant 
to federal statutory proceeding before Article III court); Thomas v. Union Carbide 
Agric. Prods., Inc., 473 U.S. 568, 592 (1985) (upholding statute that vested adminis-
trative authority in arbitral panel of private individuals in part because the courts 
retained narrowly circumscribed authority to review panel's decisions). 
121 U.S. CaNST. art. II, § 3. 
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fill his own constitutional obligation. 122 Further, the Constitution 
vests executive power in a unitary presidency-a single individual-
who must therefore be at the helm of the exercise of all executive 
power. 123 
The problem with these arguments is that the Constitution does 
not define executive power. It is therefore difficult to identify from 
the constitutional text where Congress might be infringing upon the 
President's prerogative in assigning executive power to nongovern-
ment actors. All one has to go on from the text itself are the enumer-
ated powers set forth in Article II. The President is expressly deemed 
the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, 
and of the Militia of the several States";124 he has the power "to make 
Treaties" with the advice and consent of the Senate; 125 and he has the 
exclusive power to issue pardons,126 among other things. One might 
challenge outsourcing arrangements on the grounds that the Presi-
dent-as the head of the executive branch-must have plenary con-
trol over executive discretion exercised by a private entity if that 
discretion involves negotiating treaties, directing troops in battle, or 
making pardon decisions. 127 For the vast array of administrative dis-
cretion that is generically executive in nature-such as setting stan-
dards; delivering benefits; implementing, monitoring, or enforcing 
compliance with regulations; or exerting coercive power128-the Con-
stitution is silent. The Take Care Clause empowers the President to 
make sure that executive branch officers do not flout or ignore the 
law-that they execute it faithfully-but it is not an independent 
source of presidential power. 129 The fact of a unitary executive seems 
122 Cf Peter Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional 
Analysis, 57 CEO. WASH. L. REv. 596, 600 (1989) ("A possible inference from [the 
Take Care Clause] is that the President must be able to dismiss any administrative 
officer of the government who is not faithfully executing the laws; such would be the 
most efficient means for fulfilling the President's express obligation."). 
123 See id. at 611 (making a similar argument regarding the delegation of poli-
cymaking discretion to the independent counsel and independent civil 
administrators) . 
124 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. l. 
125 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
126 [d. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
127 See Shane, supra note 122, at 610. 
128 See Freeman, supra note 61, at 547. Of course, Article II does not address the 
exercise of legislative or adjudicative power by private parties. 
129 See Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Essay on 
Marbury v. Madison, .executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 
CEO. WASH. L. REv. 253, 275 (2003) (explaining that the Take Care Clause creates an 
affirmative obligation, not a source of power). 
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merely to supplement the President's ability to effectively fulfill his 
constitutional obligations; it does not endow him with plenary execu-
tive power per se, although scholars disagree on this point. I30 
In any event, even if the language of Article II is properly read to 
assume plenary presidential control over the exercise of executive 
power, it says nothing about how the President may effectuate such 
control. His power is meaningful only to the extent that the President 
can hold miscreants accountable for disobeying his exclusive direc-
tives regarding executive functions. Can the President, in other 
words, fire subordinates for insubordination? Although the Appoint-
ments Clause131 specifies the processes for appointment to a federal 
office, the Constitution has no provision for removal of officers except 
by legislative impeachment. I32 Congress may give the President ple-
nary removal authority under its power to make laws "necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution . . . all . . . Powers" vested in the 
government, including executive power. I33 But the non-specific text 
of the Constitution gives Congress equal leeway to withhold such 
authority or even constrain the President's ability to remove officials 
exercising executive authority.134 
To the extent that Congress's ability to assign executive powers to 
private entities is confined at all, one might find some respite in the 
Appointments Clause itself. Despite the Constitution's silence on 
removal, it mandates that the President appoint "Officers"-as distin-
guished from "inferior Officers"135 whose appointment Congress may 
vest "in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 
130 See id. at 275 & n.107 ("Some have argued that the president may take any and 
every measure not expressly forbidden to protect the United States from harm."). 
131 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, d. 2. 
132 See id. art. I, § 2, d. 5 ("The House of Representatives ... shall have the sole 
Power of Impeachment."), id. art. I, § 3, d. 6-7 ("The Senate shall have the sole 
Power to try all Impeachments ... Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not 
extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy 
any Office of honor, Trust or Profit .... "); id. art. II, § 4 (Civil officers "shall be 
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.") .. 
133 See id. art. I, § 8, d. 18 (emphasis added); see also Shane, supra note 122, at 601 
(discussing the same). 
134 See Shane, supra note 122, at 600. The Supreme Court has upheld legislative 
restrictions on the President's removal power. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 
349, 356 (1958) (preventing President Eisenhower from removing a member of the 
War Crimes Commission without cause because of the quasijudicial nature of the 
Commissioner's duties); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 
(1935) (upholding restrictions on the President's ability to appoint and remove mem-
bers of the Federal Trade Commission). 
135 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, d. 2. 
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Departments."136 One need not ponder long over the question 
whether private contractors are principal "Officers" who must be 
appointed by the President, even if they are not removed by him. 
Although the Constitution contains no definitions of "Officer" or 
"inferior Officer," its language certainly establishes a hierarchy of fed-
eral officials. The President has a cabinet comprised of the most 
senior officers in the administration who are appointed by the Presi-
dent "with the Advice and Consent of the Senate."137 If the estimated 
1 0.5 million 138 private contractors working for the federal govern-
ment fall anywhere within the Appointments Clause, they certainly are 
lower in stature than members of the President's cabinet and thus 
more closely resemble the inferior officer, however that term is 
defined. 139 As such, Congress can vest their appointment in an 
agency head who-perhaps by contract-can then make appoint-
ments without Senate confirmation. 
The question next becomes whether Article II contains restric-
tions on the appointment of inferior officers that would apply to pri-
vate contractors. The Supreme Court has defined the criteria for an 
officer to include the exercise of significant authority, the duration of 
employment, and the permanent nature of the duties assigned.140 If a 
category of private contractors is found to exercise "significant author-
ity," the contractors arguably become de facto members of the federal 
government subject to constitutional requirements. In theory, agen-
cies cannot "appoint" such inferior officers by contract or otherwise 
unless Congress has vested an agency head with the power to do so 
and the officer-contractors take an oath to uphold the Constitution.141 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 See Christopher Lee, Big Government Gets Bigger, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2006, at 
A24 (noting further that the number of federal contractors increased by 2.5 million 
from 2002 to 2006). 
139 The Supreme Court has defined "inferior officer" in myriad ways. See Edmond 
v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997) ("Our cases have not set forth an exclusive 
criterion for [defining] inferior officers."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 139 (1976) 
(defining inferior officers as those charged with the enforcement and administration 
of the laws); United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1879) (defining inferior 
officers as those who can hold office). 
140 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 125-26; see id. at 160 n.162 (describing employees as "lesser 
functionaries subordinate to officers of the United States"). See generally Verkuil, 
supra note 54, at 323 (analyzing whether the Appointments Clause deters outsourcing 
of significant government authority and noting that presidential administrations have 
differed over the meaning of Buckley's "significant authority" criteria). 
141 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 & id. art. lV, cl. 3 (" [A] II executive ... Officers, both 
of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, 
to support this Constitution."). 
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Paul Verkuil suggests that "[t]he Appointments Clause ... forbids 
delegations of significant authority without congressional authoriza-
tion" under such a reading and instead "demand[s] that reasoned 
decision making remain a nondelegable duty of agency 
governance."142 
Such an argument, however, may be at odds with existing law. 
The state action doctrine preserves private status absent sufficient gov-
ernment control. To use the Appointments Clause to forbid private 
delegations would be to suggest that, because the Constitution divides 
those who work for the government into the three categories of prin-
cipal officer, inferior officer, and employee, anyone performing the 
significant duties of one of those categories must be treated as consti-
tutional-or state-actors else their contracts be voided.143 But the 
state action doctrine does not take into account the nature of a private 
actor's activities in determining state status. It focuses on the extent 
of government control. Basing state actor status on "significant 
authority" as a matter Article II, therefore, would turn the state doc-
trine on its head. 
To the extent that private contractors in fact exercise significant 
federal authority, moreover, they still might escape the requirements 
of Article II because they are temporary workers.144 As Professor 
Verkuil observes, most federal contracts are limited in scope-they 
delegate specific tasks for a specified period of time. 145 A contract for 
procurement of office supplies surely would not render Staples, Inc. a 
federal officer under a plain reading of the constitutional language. 
But even consultants who prepare agency responses to rulemaking 
comments-a policymaking role of substantial significance-do not 
have permanent positions with the federal government. 146 And the 
text of Article II does not itself confine the exercise of significant fed-
eral power to the named categories of actors. In United States v. Mau-
rice,147 Chief Justice John Marshall opined as a Circuit judge that "[a] 
142 But cf id. at 321 ("At one time the Supreme Court said that to exercise signifi-
cant authority [a] government official must actually do the work." (citing Morgan v. 
United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936»). 
143 See id. at 318 (discussing the same). 
144 See supra n.140 and accompanying text. 
145 See id. at 320 (discussing the same). 
146 See id. 
147 26 F. Cas. 1211 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747). 
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man may certainly be employed under a contract, express or implied, 
to do an act, or perform a service, without becoming an officer."148 
One might look beyond the language of the Constitution to "the 
expectations of the founding generation regarding the precise mean-
ing of their document."149 Yet an originalist analysis in all likelihood 
moves the anti-privatization ball backwards, not forwards. A search for 
the eighteenth century conception of privatized government to break 
the impasse leads to the appearance of privatization throughout 
American history. Many public functions-including taxation, police, 
and fire control-were once privately performed. 150 
At bottom, then, the clearest textual limit on privatization under 
Article II is a prohibition on legislative assignments of the exclusive 
power to make treaties, direct troops in wartime, or issue pardons to 
private parties. Congress, in turn, is arguably constrained from limit-
ing the President's ability to remove officers to the extent that 
removal is necessary to effectuate one of his express powers. 151 As for 
Article II's Vesting Clause, scholars have attempted to define "execu-
tive power" to encompass, for example, policymaking or the oversight 
of criminal prosecutions. 152 Yet the Constitution does not include 
those powers within the enumerated powers of the President. Even if 
it did, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the ability to 
structure the execution of policymaking and criminal prosecutions to 
include private components.153 The historical backdrop, moreover, 
supports privatization: the Framers were certainly aware of the tradi-
tion of private execution of government functions, and made no 
effort to constrain the practice in the Constitution. 
A few additional points bear mentioning here. To the extent that 
powers assigned to private contractors are legislative-versus execu-
tive-in nature, Article II falls beside the point. Congress has control 
over "such areas as trade and financial regulation, product safety regu-
lation, and the regulation of domestic health and environmental con-
148 Id. at 1214; see also Kinkopft, supra note 4, at 341-42 (discussing Maurice and 
arguing that there is no separation of powers ban to the delegation of federal power 
to non-federal actors). 
149 Shane, supra note 122, at 602. 
150 See Freeman, supra note 61, at 552-53. 
151 See Shane, supra note 122, at 600. 
152 See Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutlff, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 521, 527 
(2005) (defining executive power as including the authority to oversee prosecutions); 
David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Unitary Executive and Presidential Control of Executive Branch 
Rulemaking, 7 ADMIN. L. REv. AM. U. 309, 317-20 (1993) (arguing that executive 
power grants broad authority to steer policymaking). 
153 Cf Shane, supra note 122, at 610 (making similar arguments with respect to 
the constitutionality of the independent counsel). 
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cerns," for example, and nothing in the Constitution precludes the 
legislature from delegating its regulatory responsibilities. 154 Private 
contractors' hands in these matters, therefore, do not raise a conflict 
with the terms of Articles II or 1. Moreover, the tripartite constitu-
tional system was designed to govern the relationship between the 
branches. 155 The procedures contained in the respective vesting pro-
visions might not even apply to assignments outside the federal 
government.156 
A fair reading of the constitutional text, therefore, leaves no 
definitive resolution of the question whether outsourcing per se is 
unconstitutional at the margins. Implicit in the constitutional inquiry, 
however, are broader constitutional principles from which functional-
ist analyses emerge. For example, it is appropriate to consider 
whether, in assigning federal powers to nonfederal actors, Congress is 
handicapping another branch from performing its respective constitu-
tional role. Although the text and historical backdrop of the Constitu-
tion reflect a tolerance for such assignments, the Supreme Court 
routinely references implicit constitutional values-such as general 
separation of powers and checks and balances principles-in assessing 
the constitutionality of structural departures from the three-branch 
system established by the Constitution. Commentators have acknowl-
edged157 that such functionalist analysis is essential if there is to be a 
viable constitutional objection to the outsourcing of what many 
understand to be core federal powers. 
As the next Part explains, the Court has drawn critical inferences 
from the text of Article II to both support and limit Congress's ability 
to fashion novel independent agencies; accordingly, its jurisprudence 
in the independent agency arena is powerful precedent for limiting 
the federal government's ability to outsource with impunity. 
III. GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, INDEPENDENT AGENCIES, 
AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
This Part takes a fresh approach to the constitutionality of out-
sourcing by looking to established doctrine regarding independent 
154 See id. Like the private delegation doctrine, the legislative nondelegation doc-
trine is largely a dead letter. See supra note 96. 
155 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) ("The Framers regarded the 
checks and balances that they had built into the tripartite Federal Government as a 
self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch 
at the expense of the other."). 
156 See Kinkopf, supra note 4, at 339. 
157 See Warren L. Ratliff, The Due Process Failure of America's Prison Privatization Stat-
utes, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS.]. 371,382-83 (1997). 
520 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 
agencies for guidance. Independent agencies have much in common 
with government contractors exercising substantial federal authority, 
yet the parallels have gone unrecognized. This Part suggests that the 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Free Enterprise Fund-which held 
that a statute creating an independent agency within an independent 
agency was unconstitutionaP58-employs a principle of political 
accountability that may be useful in assessing the propriety of priva-
tization from the standpoint of the structural Constitution. 159 
A. Independent Agencies and Private Contractors: A Comparison 
Although there are glaring differences between private contrac-
tors and independent agencies-including that the latter are created 
by Congress and headed by presidential appointees-there are also 
fundamental overlapping characteristics that have evaded inspection. 
The point here is not to suggest that independent agencies and pri-
vate contractors raise identical issues. Rather, the suggestion is that 
there are sufficient parallels to warrant closer inspection of the ways in 
which independent agency law informs the structuring of outsourcing 
relationships to comport with broader constitutional norms. Conse-
quently, as a backdrop for later discussion of how a new privatization 
doctrine might emerge from established independent agency case 
law, this section outlines the practical points of intersection between 
independent agencies and private contractors. 
Independent agencies-such as the SEC, the FTC, and the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) -fall closer to private con-
tractors on the constitutional continuum than other executive branch 
entities for a simple reason: they are subject to less presidential over-
sight.l60 With some exceptions, independent agencies are comprised 
of multiple members-known as boards or commissions-from com-
peting political parties.l61 Although the President generally appoints 
members of independent agencies, they serve fixed, staggered terms 
that may exceed a President's time in office.l 62 The President can 
remove members of independent agencies only "for cause" under 
158 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162 
(2010). 
159 Gillian Metzger and Jack Beennann also advocate accountability approaches to 
privatization. See Beennann, supra note 105, at 1508, 1515-19; Metzger, supra note 
37, at 1456. 
160 See generally Breger & Edles, supra note 107, at 1135-37 (discussing the defini-
tion of "independent" agencies). 
161 See id. at 1236-94 (listing and describing existing independent agencies). 
162 See id. 
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express or implied statutory limitations.163 Cabinet-level agency 
heads, by contrast, are hired and fired by the President at will.l 64 
Private contractors are not appointed by the President at all, and 
are thus susceptible to presidential oversight only to the extent that an 
administration heavily polices contract terms (by including liberal ter-
mination provisions, for example), compliance, and FCA violations. 165 
Thus, as a constitutional matter, neither officers of independent agen-
cies nor private contractors are subject to the President's prerogative 
to hire and fire at will. If plotted on a constitutional continuum, both 
private contractors and independent agencies reside somewhere 
between cabinet-level agencies that function as "alter egos" of the 
President and purely private citizens with no ties to government 
whatsoever. 
Like private contractors, moreover, independent agencies exer-
cise government authority unencumbered by myriad checks on abuses 
of power that bind cabinet-level agencies. Both independent agencies 
and private contractors lie beyond the purview of executive orders 
and other statutory provisions that impose procedural safeguards on 
agencies;166 and some independent agencies-such as the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)-are similarly 
exempted from "government-in-the-sunshine" statutes like the APA 
and the FOIA.167 Both independent agencies and private contractors, 
therefore, are poised to undermine the value of centralized accounta-
bility in our constitutional structure.168 
By the same token, both private contractors and independent 
agencies exercise executive authority that would otherwise fall within 
the responsibility of a cabinet-level agency. Whereas private contrac-
tors are at least theoretically hampered by OMB Circular A-76, there is 
no legal distinction between what independent agencies and cabinet-
level agencies can do; in some instances, such as with the enforcement 
163 See id. 
164 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (holding the President has 
the absolute authority to fire a principal executive off1cer). 
165 See supra notes 61-78 and accompanying text. 
166 See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and His Administration, 94 
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 107 & n.438 (1994) (noting that independent agencies are 
expressly exempted from executive orders that require agencies to undertake cost-
benefit analysis in connection with regulations). 
167 Because Congress included a provision stating that the PCAOB is not an 
agency, it does not fall under the APA See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1) (defining "agency" as an 
"authority of the Government of the United States"); 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (b) ("No mem-
ber or person employed by, or agent for, the Board [is] an officer or employee of or 
agent for the Federal Government."). 
168 See Shane, supra note 122, at 597. 
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of federal antitrust laws by the DO] and FTC, their jurisdictions over-
lap. Similarly, private contractors are engaged in a stunning range of 
high-level government activity. They provide security and military 
support on the battlefield; make disaster relief payments and prepare 
hurricane evacuation plans for the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency;169 and conduct x-ray scans and back-of-the-hand pat-downs of 
individual passengers' privates in airports where TSA has succumbed 
to outsourcing.170 To the extent, therefore, that independent agency 
law considers broader constitutional norms in ascertaining the legiti-
macy of so-called "independent" exercises of executive authority, that 
law is worth consulting in addressing broader questions relating to the 
trajectory of outsourcing, as well. 
Finally, as a theoretical matter, both independent agencies and 
private contractors are constitutionally suspect because they do not 
fall within one of the three established branches of the Constitution. 
Independent agencies-like modern private contracting-developed 
without consideration of its broader constitutional justification. I 71 As 
Congress experiments with new forms of independent agencies, 
accountability questions-largely stemming from Article II-continue 
to reach the Supreme Court. 172 
Notwithstanding ongoing scholarly declarations of their unconsti-
tutionality, independent agencies have survived these legal challenges. 
This is partly because the Court has recognized that independent 
agencies have become an indispensible part of the fabric of the fed-
eral government for nearly a century and, as such, cannot realistically 
be dismantled. So too, if we are to assume that a boundary on out-
sourcing must be drawn somewhere, the question becomes how to 
erect one without overruling existing doctrine and upsetting the reali-
ties of the modern federal apparatus, which relies heavily on private 
contracting. 173 
169 See VerkuiI, supra note 54, at 320 & n.89. 
170 See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see also Privacy: Advanced Imaging 
Technology, TSA.cov, http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/privacy.shtm (last vis-
ited Oct. 23, 2011) (addressing privacy issues relating to new search techniques). 
Somewhat ironically, Professor Verkuil observed in 2009 that the enhanced credibility 
of "wearing [aJ badge" is what "helped lead Congress to make airport security person-
nel public officials under the Transportation Security Act" in the first place. Verkuil, 
supra note 54, at 327. 
171 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REv. 41, 43. 
172 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 
(2010). 
173 Thus, although theoretically promising, a doctrine that required congressional 
authorization for the appointment of contractor-officers under Article II might pose 
insurmountable practical problems. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text. 
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B. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board 
In many contexts, the Supreme Court has construed the structure 
of the Constitution to embody democratic norms-including checks 
and balances and the separation of powers-which serve to enable a 
democratic government" to control itself." 174 This section suggests-to 
borrow another phrase-that one such "classic element[] of repre-
sentational democracy" that is missing from the law governing priva-
tization is accountability,175 and that seeds of a democratic 
accountability principle can be found in the Supreme Court's most 
recent decision regarding the constitutionality of independent agen-
cies, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board.176 
When it comes to independent agencies, the PCAOB is unprece-
dented. In the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals at the end 
of 2001, Congress created the Board and gave it primary responsibility 
for devising and enforcing auditing standards for the accounting 
industry.177 The PCAOB promulgates rules; inspects and investigates 
firms for violations of federal securities laws; imposes censures, sus-
pensions, and monetary fines; and enjoys subpoena authority, official 
immunity from liability, and privileges from third party discovery.178 
Congress also gave this powerful independent agency extraordi-
nary independence from the constitutional branches. It exempted 
the PCAOB from the definition of "agency" for purposes of the 
AP A 179-without providing strong substitute measures for judicial 
review in the enabling legislation. Congress also empowered the 
SEC-not the President-to appoint and remove the PCAOB's five 
members, and authorized removal by the SEC only "for good cause 
shown" after a hearing on the record. 180 In doing so, Congress cre-
ated an independent agency within an independent agency, severely 
straining the chain of authority to the President who, under the origi-
174 Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 30, at 1155-56 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 
51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961». 
175 Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption, Dele-
gation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L. J. 1933, 1948 (2008) (sug-
gesting that the other benchmarks are transparency and deliberation). 
176 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
177 See Stephen Labaton, A Push to Fix the Fix on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 
2006, at C4 (describing events leading up to creation of the PCAOB). 
178 See 15 U.S.c. §§ 7211 (c), 7215 (2006). See generally Donna M. Nagy, Playing 
Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REv. 975 (2005) (exploring the constitutional status of the PCAOB). 
179 See 15 U.S.C. § 7211. 
180 [d. §§ 7211 (e)(1)-(6), 7217. 
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nal statute, was limited to firing SEC members for cause181 because 
they failed to fire the PCAOB members for cause. Congress also made 
the Board uniquely independent of legislative pressures by allowing it 
to fund itself through the collection of fees,182 to set its own 
budget,183 and to afford its members a private-sector pay scale with 
salaries that substantially exceed that of the President himself.184 
Because the PCAOB operates much more like a private entity 
than any independent agency in history, the Court's constitutional 
review of the Board's structure is particularly telling for the outsourc-
ing model. Like a private contractor, the PCAOB is effectively severed 
from direct presidential control. The Board is perhaps even more 
protected from congressional influence than are private contractors, 
as monies paid to contractors stem from legislative appropriations, 
which can be adjusted. Although a private contractor is not legisla-
tively bound to particular review measures by an agency, the bulk of 
contractor oversight-like review of the PCAOB by the SEC-comes 
from the federal contracting agencies themselves. Moreover, as with 
private contractors, the public's ability to secure judicial review of the 
PCAOB's decisions is severely hampered as compared to other agen-
cies, including so-called independent ones. 
It is therefore notable that in Free Enterprise Fund the Supreme 
Court struck down the portion of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act l85 that ren-
dered the PCAOB subject to removal for cause by the SEC, which is, in 
turn, subject to removal for cause by the President. 186 Although a 
handful of scholars have crafted various functionalist arguments for 
181 The decision was five to four. Much to the dissenting Justices' chagrin, the 
majority simply accepted the parties' agreement that the SEC is removable only for 
cause, despite the lack of statutory language to that effect; the issue was neither 
briefed nor argued. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 
S. Ct. 3138, 3148 (2010) ("The parties agree that the Commissioners cannot them-
selves be removed by the President except under the ... standard of 'inefficiency, 
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,' and we decide the case with that under-
standing." (quoting Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 
(1935»); see also id. at 3182 (Breyer, j., dissenting) ("How can the Court simply 
assume without deciding that the SEC Commissioners themselves are removable only 
'for cause?'''). 
182 See 15 U.S.c. § 7219(c) (1) (providing for the collection of "accounting support 
fees"). 
183 See id. § 7211 (c) (7). 
184 See id. §§ 7211 (f) (4), 7219. 
185 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
186 See supra note 180. 
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restraining limitless privatization,187 the majority's decision is particu-
larly illuminating for such a project, as it underscores the idea that 
democratic accountability per se is a constitutional value that may be 
applied in the related outsourcing context. 
To be sure, one distinction between the PCAOB and private con-
tractors is that, even though the statute specifies that Board members 
are not government officials, the Free Enterprise Fund parties stipulated 
that the PCAOB is "'part of the Government' for constitutional pur-
poses"188 and that its members are officers "who 'exercise significant 
authority'" for purposes of Article II .189 Although there is a compel-
ling argument that contractors entrusted with significant federal 
responsibilities are in fact functioning as officers,190 this Article does 
not hinge its analysis on these technical distinctions, albeit important 
ones. What is of interest here is the Court's repeated reference to 
accountability to the President-a form of democratic accountability-
as underlying the separation of powers; as such, one might argue, 
accountability must also be constitutionally preserved with respect to 
private contractors with attenuated relationships to the President. 
At bottom, the Free Enterprise Fund majority held that the statute's 
creation of "dual for-cause limitations on the removal of Board mem-
bers contravene[d] the Constitution's separation of powers."191 The 
Court employed a formalist reading of Article II to reach its conclu-
sion, but it also implied that a broader theory of democratic accounta-
bility is inherent in the Constitution. Such an accountability principle 
reveals itself through three primary lines of argument contained in 
the majority's opinion. 
187 See, e.g., James O. Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 
U. CHI. L. REv. 307, 318 (1976) (emphasizing "considerations of institutional compe-
tence implicit in the structural premises of the Constitution-upon the capacity of 
particular institutions of government uniquely to perform certain tasks committed to 
them by the Constitution"); David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 
61 IND. LJ. 647, 695 (1986) (discussing idea of constitutional supremacy as guarding 
against a total surrender of power to a private entity and promoting a due process 
approach). 
188 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3148 
(2010) (quoting Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 397 (1995». 
189 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125-26 (1976». 
190 See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text. The Court declined to decide 
whether '''lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the United States' must be 
subject to the same sort of control as those who exercise 'significant authority pursu-
ant to the laws.'" Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3160 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 
& n.162). 
191 Free l,nter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151. 
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First, the Court maintained that the President must, as a practical 
matter, have the power to hold accountable those who execute the 
laws. Otherwise, "the President could not be held fully accountable 
for discharging his own responsibilities; the buck would stop some-
where else."192 Under the original statute, the President has no say as 
to whether good cause exists for removal of Board members. This 
"added layer of tenure protection makes a difference," the Court rea-
soned, because if the SEC is unable to remove Board members at will, 
the President is unable to "hold the Commission fully accountable for 
the Board's conduct, to the same extent that he may hold the Com-
mission accountable for everything else that it does."193 As a result, no 
one "has full control over the Board,"194 let alone someone responsi-
ble to the President, either directly or indirectly (through removal for 
cause). 
The Court repeated the theme of accountability for its own sake 
several times. It wrote that" [t]he result is a Board that is not account-
able to the President, and a President who is not responsible for the 
Board";195 that "[t]he diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of 
accountability";196 and that "[w]ithout a clear and effective chain of 
command, the public cannot 'determine on whom the blame or the 
punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures 
ought really to fall.' "197 The Court worried, moreover, that "if allowed 
to stand, this dispersion of responsibility could be multiplied" such 
that "[t]he officers of such an agency-safely encased within a Matry-
oshka doll of tenure protections-would be immune from Presiden-
tial oversight, even as they exercised power in the people's name."198 
Second, the majority made clear that, to the extent that the Presi-
dent is rendered unable to hold accountable those who execute the 
laws, an unconstitutional interference with Article II's Vesting and 
Take Care Clauses occurs. "Since 1789," Chief Justice Roberts wrote, 
"the Constitution has been understood to empower the President to 
keep [executive] officers accountable--by removing them from office, 
if necessary."199 Although the Court repeatedly referenced removal, 
192 [d. at 3164. 
193 [d. at 3154. 
194 [d. 
195 [d. at 3153. 
196 [d. at 3155. 
197 [d. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1999». 
198 [d. at 3154. 
199 [d. at 3146 (emphasis added). 
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its Article II concern did not arise primarily from the Appointments 
Clause, from which the removal power is traditionally derived.20o 
Rather, the Court's formalist objection to the statute's double for-
cause provision was that the "arrangement is contrary to Article II's 
vesting of the executive power in the President. "201 The majority 
included the ability to hold accountable those who execute the laws as 
within the very definition of executive power; as such, it cannot be 
sloughed off. In the words of James Madison, "if any power whatso-
ever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, oversee-
ing, and controlling those who execute the laws.''202 Accordingly, the 
President "must have 'some power of removing those for whom he 
can not continue to be responsible.' "203 The PCAOB's "multilevel 
protection from removal" was thus "contrary to Article II's vesting of 
the executive power in the President"204 because it "violates the basic 
principle that the President 'cannot delegate ultimate responsibility 
or the active obligation to supervise that goes with it."'205 
Nor, the Court reasoned, can the President carry out his obliga-
tions under the Take Care Clause if he cannot maintain "the general 
administrative control of those executing the laws.''206 "Without the 
ability to oversee the Board, or to attribute the Board's failings to 
those whom he can oversee, the President is no longer the judge of 
the Board's conduct."207 As a result, "[t]he President is stripped of 
the power our precedents have preserved, and his ability to execute 
the laws-by holding his subordinates accountable for their con-
duct-is impaired."208 Under the statute, "[h]e can neither ensure 
200 See generally Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 55 (1926) (holding that the 
President may unilaterally remove executive branch officials). 
201 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154. 
202 [d. at 3151 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONGo 463 (1789»; see also id. at 3152 ("The 
landmark case of Myers v. United States reaffirmed the principle that Article II confers 
on the President 'the general administrative control of those executing the laws.''' 
(quoting Myers, 272 U.S. at 164». 
203 [d. at 3152 (quoting Myers, 272 U.S. at 117). 
204 [d. at 3154. 
205 [d. (Breyer,]., concurring in judgment) (quoting Clinton V. Jones, 520 U.S. 
681,712-13 (1997) (Breyer,]., concurring in judgment)). 
206 [d. at 3152 (quoting Myers, 272 U.S. at 164); see also id. at 3147 (noting that the 
President "cannot 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed' if he cannot over-
see the faithfulness of the officers who execute them," which is the case absent the 
ability to hold PCAOB members accountable for their actions). 
207 [d. at 3154. 
208 [d. 
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that the laws are faithfully executed, nor be held responsible for a 
Board member's breach of faith. "209 
Third, the Free Enterprise Fund Court suggested that the idea of 
accountability has roots in democratic theory. It observed that in The 
Federalist No. 51, "[t]he Framers recognized that, in the long term, 
structural protections against abuse of power were critical to preserv-
ing liberty. "210 Accordingly, "[0] ur Constitution was adopted to 
enable the people to govern themselves, through their elected lead-
ers."211 And in the Constitution, "[ t] he Framers created a structure in 
which' [a] dependence on the people' would be the 'primary control 
on the government."'212 The Constitution thus serves as the people's 
mechanism for exerting control-a conduit of power from the people 
to their government. If the source of the President's power is the peo-
ple, the people's power to govern themselves is impaired if no one is 
in a position to hold accountable all actors entrusted with executive 
authority. Indeed, the Court warned that" [t] he growth of the Execu-
tive Branch, which now wields vast power and touches almost every 
aspect of daily life, heightens the concern that it may slip from the 
Executive's control, and thus from that of the people."213 The 
PCAOB's structure was thus objectionable in part because the Presi-
dent could not hold the Board accountable for malfeasance "even 
though [it] determines the policy and enforces the laws of the United 
States."214 
Notably, the Court contended with the argument that the 
removal power is largely a formality on the ground that the President 
is in no position to meaningfully oversee all members of the executive 
bureaucracy in any event. That the PCAOB reflects "the kind of prac-
tical accommodation ... that should be permitted in a workable gov-
ernment,"215 the Court stated, is no reason to condone an 
"extraconstitutional government."216 
Nonetheless, the Court left the bulk of the PCAOB intact. It ren-
dered unconstitutional a layer of "for cause" removal but did nothing 
209 [d. 
210 [d. at 3157 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986» (citing THE 
FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 197, at 349 Games Madison». 
211 [d. at 3156. 
212 [d. at 3157 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 197, at 349 Games 
Madison». 
213 !d. at 3156. 
214 [d. at 3147. 
215 [d. at 3155 (quoting Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement 
of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252,276 (1991». 
216 !d. at 3157 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187-88 (1992». 
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to remedy the grievance that gave rise to the lawsuit-the PCAOB's 
very power to critically audit and investigate the plaintiff-accounting 
firm.217 As with its prior independent agency jurisprudence, there-
fore, the Court was hesitant to meaningfully disturb a quasi-govern-
ment entity, however novel. What the Court did do was establish a 
precedent for ensuring that the structuring of future independent 
agencies adheres to a constitutional norm of accountability; in this 
instance, a more direct line to the President. As discussed below, such 
a democratic accountability principle could similarly render constitu-
tionally mandatory the provision of sufficient accountability mecha-
nisms for government contractors as well. 
C. Accountability and the Constitutional Continuum 
If we assume for the moment that the dearth of constitutional 
oversight of private contractors should be addressed somewhere in 
constitutional law, the doctrine governing the constitutionality of 
independent agencies is a natural place to look. Yet, the logic in link-
ing privatization and independent agencies has largely escaped the 
purview of courts and scholars to date. This oversight warrants correc-
tion because, unlike the state action doctrine, the constitutional law 
governing the creation of independent agencies reflects legitimate 
worry about the exercise of inherently executive power by actors who 
are not directly accountable to the President and, thus, to the people. 
The concern over preserving democratic accountability for govern-
ment actors gained theoretical force with the majority's opinion in 
Free Enterprise Fund. To the extent that the Free Enterprise Fund Court's 
democratic accountability rationale takes hold as a stand-alone princi-
ple within the separation-of-powers rubric, the privatization debate 
could only benefit, as the private sector is less susceptible to demo-
cratic oversight than is its neighbor on the constitutional contin-
uum-the PCAOB. 
To a significant degree, current law's disparate treatment of pri-
vate contractors under the structural Constitution is justifiable. As 
noted, the jurisprudence around the constitutionality of independent 
agencies virtually assumes that the full panoply of Bill of Rights pro-
tections constrain the behavior of independent agency actors. At first 
glance, the notion that independent agency officials are state actors 
seems too obvious to mention. Of course, if the SEC appoints and 
effectively supervises the PCAOB, its members are state actors-just 
like every other government hire in the massive federal bureaucracy. 
217 The lack of redress for the plaintiffs raises interesting questions as to whether 
Article III standing to sue was satisfied in this case. 
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The same assumption does not apply if the actor is a contractor. This, 
too, makes logical sense at first blush. Private contractors are just 
that-they are employees of a private entity who perform work for a 
client that happens to be the federal government. Yet contractors are 
like federal employees in numerous ways. Contractors are hired by 
federal officials. Their salaries are paid from federal taxpayer coffers. 
Their duties, responsibilities, and limitations are governed by rules 
and standards established by the federal government, albeit memorial-
ized in federal contracts rather than in employment guidelines and 
internal regulations. They perform governmental functions that fed-
eral employees would otherwise perform. But the state action doc-
trine presumes that an actor is private-as it was before entering into 
a contract with the federal government-unless proven otherwise. 
What is it about an employee of an independent agency that flips the 
presum ption? 
The state action doctrine would answer the foregoing question by 
looking at the level of control by superior federal employees. Inde-
pendent agencies, though headed by officials who cannot be fired at 
will by the President, are nonetheless ultimately responsible to him. 
But the case of the PCAOB (and arguably, to a lesser extent, those of 
other independent agencies) demonstrates the fallacy beneath the 
state action doctrine's attempted distinction between actors who are 
"controlled" by federal officials and those who are not. Under the 
original statute, the only way the President could wield influence over 
the Board through his removal power was to direct the SEC to direct 
the PCAOB to take certain action and then fire SEC commissioners if 
they fail to do SO.218 The President can only fire SEC commissioners 
for cause, which most likely does not include disagreements with polit-
ical ideology.219 As a practical matter, therefore, there may be a nar-
rower gulf between the PCAOB as originally constituted and a private 
contractor than one would expect when it comes to accountability to 
the President.22o 
Another distinction between independent agencies and private 
contractors is that Congress creates independent agencies by statute, 
218 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3149. 
219 See id. at 3148. 
220 In Free Enterprise Fund, the majority suggested-without further explanation-
that "a removal standard appropriate for limiting Government control over private 
bodies may be inappropriate for officers wielding the executive power of the United 
States" and that "[w]e do not decide ... whether 'lesser functionaries subordinate to 
officers of the United States' must be subject to the same sort of control as those who 
exercise 'significant authority pursuant to the laws.''' Id. at 3158,3160 (quoting Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 & n.162 (1976». 
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whereas private initiative and market forces account for the prolifera-
tion of government contracting firms. But Congress has also estab-
lished for-profit corporations like Amtrak, which the Supreme Court 
deemed a governmental body despite legislative provisions to the con-
trary, explaining that Congress cannot relieve "what the Constitution 
regards as the Government" by proclaiming an entity a private corpo-
ration. 221 Amtrak is federally funded and controlled by a board of 
presidential appointees.222 The appointee-structure only begs the 
normative question, however, of whether the Constitution requires 
similar oversight conditions for private contractors. Thus, the mere 
fact that one entity is created by congressional statute and the other is 
borne of private sector initiative may be too slender a reed on which 
to determine the entirety of constitutional doctrine related to the out-
sourcing of federal powers. What seems important is not who creates 
the entity but, rather, what powers it actually wields and the extent to 
which it is accountable, in exercising those powers, to government 
officials who are themselves politically accountable. 
What overshadows these differences is a critical feature that inde-
pendent agencies and private contractors share: the ability to exercise 
executive power. Indeed, the query over the constitutionality of inde-
pendent agencies is shaded by constitutional concerns precisely 
because of the nature of the power being exercised and its potential 
interference with the exclusive powers of the President. In Free Enter-
prise Fund, the Supreme Court characterized the problem as one of 
accountability. 
With private contractors, the accountability problem is only exac-
erbated. In the privatization world, there is a greater concern that 
"governmental power-power coercive in nature-will be used to fur-
ther" private interests at the expense of competing public ones.223 
Public officials are expected to exercise power in a disinterested 
way,224 or be held accountable for abuses. Indeed, with federal agen-
cies, the "overwhelming thrust" of the Court's involvement has been 
to make administrative processes more open to citizen participation 
and to ensure an adequate record for judicial review.225 Private con-
tractors are incentivized to act out of personal interest, without the 
political process there to oust them.226 They cannot be ordered by 
221 See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374,400 (1995). 
222 See Nagy, supra note 178, at 1037-38 (discussing Lebron). 
223 Lawrence, supra note 187, at 659. 
224 See id. 
225 See Craig & Gilmour, supra note 1, at 58. 
226 See Lawrence, supra note 187, at 660. 
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the government to perform a certain thing, or fired or disciplined for 
failing to do so, unless the contract allows it.227 
When it comes to privatization, the collective focus has been on 
managerial solutions rather than issues of constitutional and demo-
cratic governance.228 Managerial solutions alone, however, are insuf-
ficient. It is "inevitable that ... some contractors will be in a position 
to define individual rights, withhold information that government 
agencies would be required to release, frame policy options, set public 
policy through their street-level interactions, and exercise influence-
or even supervision-over public employees."229 For both indepen-
dent agency actors and private contractors, therefore, "[t]he ultimate 
issue ... is the exercise of public power, and the creation of public 
policy, by an entity without democratic credentials or direct political 
accountability."230 Private contractors' independence trom the demo-
cratically-accountable branches of government stokes real "fear[s] of 
arbitrary, unreflective governance"231 that statutes like the APA were 
designed to hamper when it comes to federal actors. A values-driven 
approach to constitutional interpretation can penetrate the dearth, by 
comparison, of judicial and political mechanisms for holding contrac-
tors accountable to the public they are charged with serving. 
Drawing upon the Court's analysis in Free Enterprise Fund, there-
fore, an argument may be made that the outsourcing of especially sen-
sitive federal functions must be accompanied by a framework of 
democratic accountability for the exercise of such functions. Because 
private contractors are not subject to the President's appointment and 
removal power, they cannot be held politically accountable to the 
executive branch for the exercise of delegated power under the 
Appointments Clause. But Free Enterprise Fund did not turn on the 
Appointments Clause; it hinged on a finding that the lack of account-
ability for actors exercising executive power prevents the President 
from meaningfully supervising execution of the law under the Vesting 
and Take Care Clauses of Article 11.232 Private constituencies attuned 
227 See Pierce, supra note 66, at 1228. 
228 See Rosenbloom & Piotrowski, supra note 72, at 109. 
229 ld. at 109. 
230 Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 319, 335 (2002) (quot-
ing Jonathan Weinberg, lCANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE LJ. 187, 191 
(2000». 
231 Krent, supra note 99, at 70; see also Craig & Gilmour, supra note 1, at 61-62 
(stating that concern with privatization is that society will end up with two govern-
ments-one subject to the rule of law and the Constitution and the other "an outlaw 
government, composed of quasi government and quasi private institutions which are 
utilizing public authorities for their own purposes") (internal quotation omitted». 
232 See Krent, supra note 99, at 67. 
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to market forces are not subject to the executive supervision or judi-
cial review that constrains their federal counterparts. As Harold Krent 
has observed, this result "can only be reconciled with the constitu-
tional structure by abandoning (or at least truncating) [AJ rtide II's 
requirement that the executive branch must superintend execution of 
all federallaws."233 An accountability principle that is based in Article 
II would operate by requiring some amalgam of accountability mea-
sures as a constitutional matter. The integrity of the entire political 
system would benefit from the perks of responsible government that 
accompany accountability structures-such as public access, meaning-
ful responsiveness, sound policy, rationality in decision-making,234 
and judicial review, which promotes fair procedures and prevents pri-
vate interests from dominating the exercise of public power.235 
A number of points about the constitutionality of privatization 
seem clear. Whatever the solution, it will likely vary with the circum-
stances.236 It will also require highly trained government staff to craft 
workable strategies for specific situations.237 This, itself, will be expen-
sive and difficult to achieve.238 But the political rationale for account-
ability is compelling. 239 What is needed is a theoretical rationale-
one that captures the relationship of privatization to modern govern-
ment-if the implications of outsourcing are to be fully under-
stood.240 The inherent concept of government that is created by the 
structural Constitution assumes that procedural norms are in place 
indefinitely to protect against tyrannical use of power. Scholars have 
searched for a "doctrinal hook"241 for converting our intrinsic sense of 
the necessity of accountability for public contractors into a workable 
principle. That hook, made more concrete by the majority in Free 
Enterprise Fund, could be a principle of democratic accountability that 
233 Id. at 68. Professor Krent adds that "the value of political participation" also 
"arguably underlies our constitutional fabric" and is undermined by free-reign priva-
tization. See id. Professor Krent has further suggested that privatization undermines 
the Appointments Clause by permitting Congress to "exercise both a de facto appoint-
ment and removal authority" when it creates an office for contractors and designates 
an office holder extra-constitutionally. See id. at 78. 
234 See Lawrence, supra note 187, at 665. The bureaucracy that enables govern-
ment to act predictably and fairly, however, hampers innovation and flexibility. See id. 
at 654. 
235 See Freeman, supra note 61, at 559. 
236 See Rubin, supra note 39, at 930. 
237 See id. at 934. 
238 See Kramer, supra note 46, at 46. 
239 See Rubin, supra note 39, at 908. 
240 See id. 
241 Craig & Gilmour., supra note 1, at 63. 
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springs from the structural Constitution. In the contest between gov-
ernment actors and private ones, public accountability loses unless 
power is assigned within a distinctly public framework for accountabil-
ity that "puts people at the center."242 Requiring public accountability 
for private contractors participating in sensitive government functions 
is justifiable as a constitutional matter; the next question is how to 
effectuate the principle in practice. 
CONCLUSION 
The question this Article attempts to address is whether there is 
any point at which the Constitution cares about outsourcing and its 
broader implications. If the entire administrative apparatus other 
than the constitutionally-named members of the executive branch-
the President, the Vice President, and the Treasury Department243-
were handed off to Lockheed Martin, would that be constitutional? 
The Supreme Court has never addressed the question, and scholar-
ship advancing affirmative constitutional theories regarding privatiza-
tion per se is sparse.244 Yet by most accounts, federal government 
outsourcing suffers from a lack of systematized accountability,245 
which only a constitutional approach can fully capture. 
The reason why the constitutionality of privatization has only 
marginally come within the purview of courts and scholars is that pre-
vailing doctrine hinges on an inaccurate understanding of the 
nuanced relationship between private contractors and federal entities. 
Rather than residing in distinct private/public spheres, all actors exer-
cising the powers of the federal government lie on a constitutional 
continuum, which begins with the President and his cabinet and ends 
with purely private entities possessing no federal authority whatsoever. 
Viewed this way, "government by contract"246 has inescapable implica-
tions from the standpoint of the structural Constitution. 
242 Minow, supra note 7, at 1266. 
243 See U.S. CaNST. art. II, § 1, d. 1; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (mentioning the Treasury). 
244 Cogent arguments have been made for the absence of constitutional bounda-
ries on outsourcing arrangements. Cf Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Priva-
tization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REv. 397, 400-01 (2006) (describing 
arguments in defense of privatization). 
245 But seeJody Freeman, Extending Public Accountability Through Privatization: From 
Public Law to Publicization, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILI"IY 83, 83 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 
2006) ("Private contributions to service provision, and even to regulation, are not 
necessarily or exclusively dangerous and corrosive of public accountability-which is 
how they seem to be perceived in mainstream administrative law."). 
246 Freeman & Minow, supra note 12, at l. 
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Accordingly, the Article searches for a constitutional principle-
distinct from the flawed state action and defunct private delegation 
doctrines-that could be deployed to establish boundaries on priva-
tization if there were ever public consensus that federal outsourcing 
has gone too far. It compares private contracting with an entity that is 
loosely analogous to the private contractor: the independent agency. 
It then suggests that the Supreme Court in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public 
Co. Accounting Oversight Board sketched out a constitutional accounta-
bility principle that could apply with even greater force to private con-
tractors who, under the current legal regime, are less confined than 
independent agencies by mainstream legal and structural restraints. 
In short, the structure of outsourcing relationships should be viewed 
as having constitutional implications, particularly to the extent that 
sensitive governmental functions are involved. From this perspective, 
then, government agents and ultimately the courts could systemati-
cally screen such relationships to ensure that sufficient mechanisms 
for ensuring democratic accountability exist. 
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